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COMMENT
NAFFA and the Textile and Apparel Industries:
"Made in North America"
I. Introduction
On December 17, 1992, during the final months of his Presidency,
George Bush signed a draft proposal of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA),' an agreement between Mexico, Canada,
and the United States. NAFTA was approved by Congress in Novem-
ber of 1993 under the fast track procedures of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988,2 creating a total market larger than the
European Community, encompassing 370 million people and $6.5 tril-
lion. 3 The agreement provides for the progressive elimination of all
Karen Rothmyer, Bush's Parting Gift, NEWSDAY (Nassau), Dec. 18, 1992, at 57; see also
Bush Signs NAFTA to Cheers, Protests, WWD, Dec. 18, 1992, at 11.
2 See Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1988).
See also CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS (CRS), A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AREA? A BREF
REVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES 1-2 (May 17, 1991) [hereinafter MAJOR ISSUES]; U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, PuB. No. 2353, THE LIKELY IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES OF A FREE TRADE AGREE-
MENT wrrTH MEXICO, xix (Feb. 1991) [hereinafter LIKELY IMPACT]. Fast track authority allows
the President to negotiate a trade agreement while'consulting with Congress on a regular
basis. However, Congress can only vote for or against the agreement as negotiated by the
President. Congress cannot alter provisions in the agreement but can add new provisions.
Under fast track provisions, the administration must submit to Congress the agreement and
an implementing bill outlining the changes that must be made to existing laws and regula-
tions in order to comply with the agreement. Congress then has ninety days to consider the
agreement, and both houses have to vote either for or against NAFrA by a simple majority.
U.S., Canada, Mexico Reach North American Free Trade Agreement, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS
DIGEST, Aug. 13, 1992, at Al [hereinafter U.S., Canada, Mexico Reach Agreement]. Fast track
authority was set to expire in March of 1993. Id. However, because the President had already
signed the agreement by the date his fast track authority expired, it was not necessary to get
an extension of the authority. Id. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2596, POTENTrL
IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE-TRADE
AGREEMENT, app. e at 2 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter POTENTAL IMPACT]. See also LIKELY IMPACT,
app. xix. The House of Representatives passed NAFTA and its implementing legislation by a
vote of 234 to 200 on November 17, 1993. James Cerstenzang & Michael Ross, House Passes
NAFTA, 234-200, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al. On November 20, the Senate voted to pass
NAF'A by a margin of 61-38. William J. Eaton &James Risen, Senate OKs Extension of Benefits
for Jobless; Congress: Measure Would Help California's Long-Term Unemployed. Upper House Also
Passes NAFTA, 61-38, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at Al; How Our Senators Voted, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1993, at A13.
3 U.S., Canada, Mexico Reach Agreement, supra note 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Curmt File.
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tariffs on goods originating in the NAFTA countries.4 The rules of
origin determine which products qualify for this preferential treat-
ment.5 Additionally, once a product originating in a non-NAFTA
country has been imported into a NAFTA country and the appropriate
tariff has been paid, such product may be transported into another
NAFTA country duty-free. 6
Although NAFTA is a trilateral treaty among the United States,
Canada, and Mexico, this Comment only discusses the effects of a U.S.
free trade agreement with Mexico because Canada and the United
States are on a similar level of economic development, have similar
interests in a free trade agreement, and will be similarly affected by a
free trade agreement with Mexico. 7 Additionally, the United States
and Canada have operated under a free trade agreement similar to
NAFTA since 1989.8 Therefore, a discussion of U.S.-Mexican trade re-
lations and the effects on the United States of a free trade agreement
with Mexico should be a sufficient analysis of the effects of NAFTA on
the United States.
The focus of this Comment is NA!FTA's possible effects on the U.S.
textile and apparel industries. To this end, the Comment begins with a
brief survey of the history of trade relations between Mexico and the
United States and continues in Part II.B to explain, compare, and con-
trast the textile and apparel industries. Part III sets out the NAFTA
provisions that are most likely to affect these industries. Against this
background, Part IV delineates the differing opinions as to the effects
of a U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement on the U.S. economy and, more
specifically, on the textile and apparel industries. The Comment finally
concludes in Part V that NAFTA will affect the balance of trade be-
tween the United States and Mexico only minimally, but should prove
favorable to the United States.
H. Background
A. History of U.S.-Mexican Trade Relations
Historically, Mexico has exhibited strong protectionist tendencies
caused in part by its distrust of the United States.9 In the mid-1800s,
Mexico lost a substantial amount of territory, including Texas and
what is now the American Southwest, to the United States.10 Later,
4 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican
States, Nov. 17, 1992, art. 302, annex 302.2, annex 300-B, § 2, available in WESTLAW, NA.rA
Library [hereinafter NAFTA].
5 NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 401, 402, annex 300-B, § 7, annex 401, § XI.
6 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 301.
7 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (CRS), NORTH AMERc.AN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS 2 (Mar. 25, 1991) [hereinafter IssuEs FOR CONGRESS].
8 Id. at 4.
9 Id. at 11.
10 Id. at 15.
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during the Mexican Revolution, the United States occupied Mexico's
Veracruz, which led to continued Mexican wariness toward the United
States. 1
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, investors from the United
States invested heavily in Mexico at a level that eventually exceeded
Mexico's domestic investment and all other foreign investment com-
bined.12 The heavy U.S. investment spurred the Mexican government
to adopt policies geared toward the protection of domestic industry. 13
The government nationalized the Mexican oil industry in the 1930s
and instituted socialist economic reforms. 14 Relations between the
United States and Mexico improved throughout the 1930s with Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt's establishment of the "Good Neighbor Policy." 15
However, Mexico still restricted foreign investment and controlled its
exchange rates in an effort to avoid domination of its economy by for-
eign nations. 16
The discovery of large oil reserves in the 1970s allowed Mexico to
obtain sizeable loans from foreign countries and banks. By 1982, how-
ever, Mexico was unable to service this debt.17 During this debt crisis,
the Mexican government began a series of debt restructuring and eco-
nomic reforms including decreases in foreign trade barriers, diversifi-
cation of the Mexican economy away from oil production, and
institution of incentives for foreign investors.' 8 Even after these re-
forms, however, the Mexican economy was unable to recover, and the
government continued to have trouble servicing its debt.' 9 Again, in
1986, the Mexican government enacted more economic reforms in-
cluding privatization of state-owned industries, reformation of the tax
system, liberalization of foreign investment, and entry into member-
ship of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).20
" Id. at 11, 15. The Mexican Revolution started in 1910 and lasted approximately thirty
years. Id. at 15.
12 Id. at 11.
13 Id. at 12.
14 Id. at 15.
15 Id. at 11. The Good Neighbor Policy adopted by the United States was a policy of
respect for the sovereignty of other nations in North and South America through noninter-
vention in other nations' internal affairs. Id.
16 LIKELY IMPACr, supra note 2, at 1-1.
17 Id.
18 IssuEs FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 12.
19 Id. at 17.
20 Id. GATT is a forty-four-year-old agreement between most major nations to reduce
trade barriers. Brian O'Reilly, Fixing the Economy: How to Keep Exports on a Roll, FORT., Oct. 19,
1992, at 68. Mexico has agreed to GATT provisions on technical barriers to trade, anti-dump-
ing, licensing, and customs valuation. LIKELY IMPACr, supra note 2, at 1-2 n.6. An additional
provision requires that any country who grants trade concessions to another GATT7 country
must make those concessions available to all GATT members. This recent is referred to as
the most-favored nation principle. However, Article XXIV of GATT permits free trade agree-
ments with some limitations. IssuEs FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 2. The recent approval of
the Uruguay Round of GAT negotiations may influence substantially the effects of NAFTA.
However, the effects of GATT" are beyond the scope of this paper.
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In 1987, Mexico and the United States entered into the first agree-
ment to govern trade between the two countries.2 1 A second agree-
ment in 1989 established negotiating procedures to expand bilateral
trade and investment.2 2 Finally, in 1990, President George Bush and
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari issued ajoint statement in
favor of negotiating a free trade agreement.23
Through Mexico's trade reforms in 1985, its entry into GATT in
1986, and the trade agreements of 1987 and 1989 with the United
States, Mexico and the United States now have relatively low trade bar-
riers between the two countries. Mexico has reduced its highest tariffs
from 100% to 20% and has cut its average tariff in half, from 16.9% to
8.2%.24 The average tariff on U.S. goods entering Mexico was about
10% in 1993.25 Additionally, Mexico has decreased some non-tariff
barriers.2 6 For example, the Mexican reforms reduced the number of
import products requiring trade licenses from 12,000 to 230 prod-
ucts.2 7 The average U.S. tariff on Mexican goods was estimated to be
between 2.5%28 and 4% in 1993.29 By 1992, 50% of Mexican goods
imported to the United States came in duty-free, and the balance was
subject to duties of less than 4%.30
As a result of decreased trade barriers, U.S. trade with Mexico has
increased dramatically since the mid- to late 1980s. 31 In 1987, U.S.
exports to Mexico totaled about $14 billion and imports from Mexico
totaled about $19.8 billion, leaving the United States with a trade defi-
cit of approximately $5.8 billion.3 2 In 1988, exports increased to $19.8
billion, and imports increased to $22.6 billion, reducing the annual
21 ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 12. The agreement provided an agenda for the
reduction or elimination of barriers to trade and a framework through which the two coun-
tries could discuss trade issues, Id. Under this agreement, Mexico and the United States
liberalized trade in the steel and textile industries as well as in the alcoholic beverages indus-
try. Additionally, the two have been negotiating other opportunities to increase trade. Id.
22 Id. at 12.
23 Id.
24 MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 4.
25 Lloyd Bentsen, Is NAFTA Good for the U.S. /Yes: Mexico's Market Is Ripe for U.S. Exports,
USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 1993, at A13.
26 See LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 1-2; POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 2, at 1-7. Mexico
still imposes non-tariff barriers including import licenses and official import prices. Other
Mexican trade barriers include "discriminatory government procurement policies; standards,
testing, and certification requirements; limited intellectual property protection in many sec-
tors... ; and exclusive sales rights and distribution contracts." LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at
1-2.
27 LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 1-2.
28 James Gerstenzang, Ticket Fee to Finance Free Trade Pact May Be Dropped, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1993, at A26.
29 Bentsen, supra note 25, at A13.
30 The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (Educational Broadcasting Broadcast, Oct. 7, 1992),
Transcript No. 4471, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter MacNeill
Lehrer]. See also LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 2-2; MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 4.
31 LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 1-4.
32 Id. app. e.
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deficit to $2.8 billion.33 In 1990, exports increased to $28.4 billion and
in 1992, exploded to $41.9 billion.3 4 Most industries have benefited
from Mexico's reduction in trade barriers, including the textile and
apparel industries.3 5
B. The Textile and Apparel Industries
Before investigating imports and exports of the textile and ap-
parel industries, it is necessary to examine briefly the nature of these
industries, their history, and their structure today. The textile industry
encompasses the production of yarn or thread and the production of
fabrics from these materials;3 6 the apparel industry encompasses the
cutting and sewing of the fabric into clothing.3 7 The textile industry is
high-tech, capital intensive, and generally requires highly skilled work-
ers.38 Textile manufacturing, finishing, and dyeing require an abun-
dance of clean water and a reliable source of electricity.3 9 Unlike the
rest of the industry, the cutting sector of the apparel industry is also
highly skilled and automated. 40 In many plants, the cutting operations
are controlled by computers, and therefore require a reliable electrical
source as well. 4 1
The rest of the apparel industry, which consists of the fabrication
of pieces of cloth into clothing, is labor intensive. 4 2 Labor comprises
more than thirty-one percent of total apparel production costs as com-
pared to twenty-two percent to twenty-five percent for the textile indus-
try.43 As a result, the apparel industry does not require as much
infrastructure as the textile industry. All that is necessary is electricity,
and as Eric Hoyle, Chief Financial Officer of Bali Co., pointed out,
"You can put a generator outside [the plant] if the power is
unreliable."44
The labor intensive nature of both the textile and alparel indus-
tries is the source of much competition in these sectors from develop-
33 Id.
34 North American Free Trade Agreement: An Assessment, FED. NEws SERVICE, Dec. 15, 1992
(Statement of Jeffrey J. Schott, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics before
the Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Rep.), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Currnt File [hereinafter An Assessment].
35 See infra notes 45-68 and accompanying text for discussion of U.S. textile and apparel
trade with Mexico. See also infra tbls. 1, 2.
36 LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 4-38 to 4-39.
37 Id. at 4-39.
38 Laura Zelenko, Down Mexico Way: Is That Where TarheelJobs Will Be Headed if the North
American Free Trade Agreement Is Approved, Bus.-N.C., Nov. 1992, at 24, 34-35.
39 Id. at 29.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 25. See also LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 4-38.
43 Zelenko, supra note 38, at 25.
44 Id. at 29. Bali Co. is a large apparel firm based in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
The company employs 500 workers at each of 2 bra-sewing plants located in Mexico. Id. at
27.
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ing countries with low average wages. 45 For example, the average
hourly pay for a textile or apparel worker in Mexico is between $1.50
and $2.00,46 compared to U.S. average hourly wages of $8.59.4 7 As a
result, the United States regularly runs a trade deficit in these
industries.48
Another reason for the trade deficit with Mexico is the maqui-
ladora industry. 49 The Mexican maquiladora program was established in
1965 to help decrease the unemployment rate in Mexico.50 The pro-
gram allowed foreign firms to own assembly plants in Mexico and to
import intermediate materials for assembly, but only if all final prod-
ucts were exported. 51
Mexico changed the law in 1989 to allow maquiladoras to sell their
products domestically.52 Sales in Mexico, however, are still re-
stricted. 53 For each $100 exported, the maquiladoras may sell only $50
worth of their goods in Mexico.54 Mexico also offers a system of full-
duty drawbacks through which maquiladora exporters can receive re-
bates for any import duties paid.55 United States customs laws have
45 The U.S. textiles and apparel industries face stiff competition from many low wage
countries such as those in the Far East. Corporations in these countries pay lower wages than
American workers are paid. Thus, the products are less expensive than U.S. products. By
allowing free trade between Mexico and the United States, U.S. companies will be able to
take advantage of the lower wage level in Mexico to become more competitive with Pacific
Rim textiles and apparel. See Jennifer Reingold, Heap Big Smoke ... Why the Controversial
NAFFA May Be Less Than Meets the Eye, FIN. WooD, Feb. 16, 1993, at 40; see also LIKELY IMPACT,
supra note 2, at 4-40; POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 2, at 8-4 to 8-6. Louis S. Richman, How
NAFTA Will Help America, FORT., Apr. 19, 1993, at 95. See also infra notes 64-68 and accompa-
nying text.
46 Zelenko, supra note 38, at 27.
47 1992 U.S. Textile Industry Business Review, PR Newswire, Dec. 29, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter 1992 Review].
48 See American Textile Manufacturers Institute Releases Review, PR Newswire, Dec. 15, 1987,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter 1987 Review]; 1988 U.S. Textile In-
dustry Business Review, PR Newswire, Dec. 27, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt
File [hereinafter 1988 Review]; 1990 U.S. Textile Industry Business Review, PR Newswire, Dec. 27,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter 1990 Review]; 1991 U.S. Textile
Industry Business Review, PR Newswire, Dec. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt
File [hereinafter 1991 Review], 1992 Review, supra note 47; Textile Production Up, Employment
Down, UPI, Dec. 28, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter 1989
Review].
49 Jeff Silverstein, Survival of a Dinosaur, Bus. MExico, Nov. 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Currnt File.
50 IssuEs FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 19; see also LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 1-5.
51 Silverstein, supra note 49. Mexican law provided that companies in Mexico must
have majority Mexican ownership. IssuEs FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 19. The maquiladora
program exempted maquiladoras from this law and from the Mexican law prohibiting foreign
ownership of land near its borders. Id. At first maquiladoras were permitted only in the bor-
der regions near the United States, but now they are permitted in the interior of Mexico.
LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 1-5; IssuEs FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 19.
52 Silverstein, supra note 49.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. "For example, if a firm paid a US $100 import tax followed by a US $50 export
tax, the company is entitled to a $100 rebate." Id. This program benefits not only maqui-
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aided the development of the maquiladora program by charging duties
only on the total value of the product less the cost of the product's U.S.
components. 56
Even though the United States has charged low duties on textiles
and apparel produced by the maquiladoras, the textile and apparel in-
dustries as a whole still have been the most protected industries in the
United States over the last thirty years. 57 The average U.S. tariff on
textiles is approximately twenty percent, and the average tariff on all
imported goods is approximately four percent.58 Over the last few
years, the United States has liberalized its import quotas with Mexico,
eliminating quotas on articles produced from U.S. made and cut
fabrics, while increasing quotas on other types of textile and apparel
goods from countries other than Mexico, such as those from the Far
East.
5 9
Even though the trade barriers between the United States and
Mexico are relatively low, textile and apparel trade with Mexico consti-
tutes only a small portion of total U.S. textile and apparel trade.60 Ta-
ble 1 below shows U.S. imports from and exports to Mexico in the
textile and apparel industries in millions of U.S. dollars. Table 2 dem-
onstrates the performance of the U.S. textile and apparel industries in
terms of exports, imports, and U.S. trade deficit in these industries in
billions of U.S. dollars.
ladoras using U.S. products but also those using materials from other developing countries,
including those in the Caribbean and the Far East. Id.
56 LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 4-39. The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States (HTS), in provisions 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80, provides for these favorable duties.
Countries other than Mexico, such as Canada and Japan, take advantage of these provisions
as well. LIKELY IMPACr, supra note 2, at 4-39.
57 Brenda Lloyd, Apparel Contractors Still Apprehensive About NAFTA, WWD, Oct. 27, 1992,
at 14.
58 Central America's Textile Problem; Excluded From CBI, LATIN AMERICAN RECIONAL REP.:
MEXICO & NAFTA REP. (Latin American Newsletters, Ltd.),Jan. 14, 1993, at 4. U.S. trade
weighted duties average 17% ad valorem for apparel and 8% for textiles. Because a large
number of Mexican-produced garments are made out of U.S. components (thereby falling
under HTS) the effective rate is only 6%. Mexican barriers to trade in the textile and ap-
parel industries are much higher than in the United States. Mexican duties on textiles range
from 12% to 18% and on apparel average approximately 20%. LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2,
at 4-38.
59 LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 4-39. See supra note 45 for discussion on Far East
competition.
60 MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 6.
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Table 161
U.S. Textile and Apparel Trade with Mexico
(in millions)
1988 1989 1990 1991
Exports $598 $702 $854 $1017
Imports $565 $646 $678 $879
Trade Surplus $33 $56 $176 $138
Table 262
Total U.S. Textile and Apparel Trade
(in billions)
1986 1987 198863 1989 1990 1991 1992e
Textile &
apparel imports 24.7 28.9 29.7 33.6 33.7 35.0 42.0
Textile &
apparel exports 3.5 4.1 5.1 7.2 7.4 8.7 9.9
Trade Deficit 21.3 24.8 24.7 26.4 26.3 26.4 32.0
e = estimated
The two tables show that Mexican imports accounted for only 2%,
2.1%, 2.5%, and 2.9% of all U.S. imports of textiles and apparel in
1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991 respectively. The ratio of U.S. exports of
textiles and apparel to Mexico to U.S. exports of textiles and apparel
to the rest of the world was higher at 11.8%, 9.8%, 11.5%, and 11.7%
for the same years respectively.
The U.S. textile and apparel industries face stiff competition from
China, Pakistan, and India. 64 M.L. Cates, Jr., president of the Ameri-
can Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI), asserted that these coun-
tries "have been allowed to increase their shipments to the U.S. while
at the same time virtually closing their markets to our exports."65
China's textile and apparel imports to the United States exceeded all
textile and apparel imports from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central
America combined.6 6 China's $13 billion trade surplus with the
United States is mostly from textiles. 67 According to Cates, the increas-
61 Juanita Darling, Fears of Free Trade, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at DI.
62 1987 Review, supra note 48; 1988 Review, supra note 48; 1989 Review, supra note 48;
1990 Review, supra note 48; 1991 Review, supra note 48; 1992 Review, supra note 47.
63 There was no Textile Industry Review available for 1989. Therefore, the 1988 figures
are estimates from the 1988 report.
64 Textile and Apparel Import Surge Threatens Proposed NAFTA, ATM! Says, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1813 (Oct. 21, 1992). See also supra note 45 for brief discussion of Far
East competition.
65 Id. ATMI is the national trade association of the U.S. textile industry.
66 Id.
67 O'Reilly, supra note 20, at 68.
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ing imports from the Far East have contributed to tremendous job
losses in the textile and apparel industries -in the United States.6a
Although U.S.-Mexican textile and apparel trade and, indeed,
U.S. textile and apparel trade with the whole world, has increased sub-
stantially over the past several years, employment in the textile and
apparel industries decreased substantially throughout the 1980s.69
Over one million textile and apparel jobs disappeared during this time
period due, in part, to imports from the Far East,70 but also due to




Wages and Weekly Earnings in the Textile Industry
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992e
Employment-
textiles 705 725 729 723 691 672 678
Average hourly
wages $6.95 $7.17 $7.35e $7.67 $8.02 $8.30 $8.59
Average weekly
earnings $286 $300 $302e $314 $320 $337 $353
e = estimated
Possible loss of U.S. jobs is one of the most controversial issues in the
NAFTA debate and will be discussed later in this Comment.
III. Provisions of the North American Free. Trade Agreement
In 1990, President George Bush and President Carlos Salinas of
Mexico endorsed a plan to formulate a bilateral free trade agreement
between the United States and Mexico. 73 Shortly thereafter, Canada
proposed participation in a North American free trade agreement.
74
NAFTA was negotiated in the United States under fast track authority
granted to the President by Congress in 1991. 75 Bush, Salinas, and
Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada initialed the preliminary draft of
NAFTA on August 12, 1992,76 and then signed the final text on De-
68 U.S. Textile Industy Improved In 1992, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at 3 (Jan. 13, 1993).
69 See infra tbl. 3.
70 Darling, supra note 61. See also supra notes 45, 64-68 for discussion on competition
from the Far East in the textile industry.
71 LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 4-38.
72 1987 Review, supra note 48; 1988 Review, supra note 48; 1989 Review, supra note 48;
1990 Review, supra note 48; 1991 Review, supra note 48, 1992 Review, supra note 47.
73 LIKELY IMPACr, supra note 2, at xix.
74 Id.
75 U.S., Canada, Mexico Reach Agreement, supra note 2; see also POTENTIAL IMPAcr, supra
note 2, at 2, app. e. See supra note 2, for explanation of fast track authority.
76 Bush Signs NAFFA to Cheers, Protests, supra note 1.
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cember 17, 1992. 77
However, under the new Clinton administration, there was initial
uncertainty as to what direction NAFTA would take. President Clinton
promised during his campaign that, although he would not renegoti-
ate the text of NAFTA, he would negotiate several side agreements to
accompany the treaty.7 8 In a meeting with Salinas before taking office,
Clinton said that NAFTA would require additional guarantees regard-
ing workers' rights and the environment. 79 Additionally, he had pro-
posed a side agreement addressing the problems of import surges.8 0
Clinton signed labor, environmental, and import surges side agree-
ments in August of 1993.81
The provisions of NAFTA are based on the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement which went into effect on January 1, 1989.82
The most significant provisions of NAIFTA provide for (1) reduction or
elimination of tariffs and quotas;83 (2) rules of origin which require
that goods be comprised of a certain amount of North American
materials in order to receive preferential treatment;84 and (3) safe-
guard provisions. 85 NAFTA will eliminate immediately, or phase out
over ten years, all tariffs on textiles and apparel products imported
from Mexico.8 6 Additionally, the United States will immediately elimi-
nate quotas on Mexican textiles and apparel that meet the rules of
origin and gradually eliminate quotas on Mexican imports that do
not.8
7
The rules of origin determine which goods receive free trade
77 U.S., Canada, Mexico Reach Agreement, supra note 2.
78 Keith Bradsher, Study Says Trade Pact Will Aid U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at
DI [hereinafter Study Says Pact WillAid U.S.]. See North American Free Trade Agreement Labor and
Environmental Supplemental Accords Along with a Summary of Those Agreements, Issued by U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor Aug. 13, 1993, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) 156 (Aug. 16,
1993), [hereinafter Labor and Environmental Accords]. See infra notes 149-57 and accompanying
text for brief discussion of side agreements.
79 Colin Narbrough, GATT Teams Sit on Their Hands and Wait for Clinton to Roll in, THE
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993. See Labor and Environmental Accords, supra note 78.
80 Bradsher, Study Says Pact Will Aid U.S., supra note 78. See Labor and Environmental
Accords, supra note 78.
81 Labor Leaders Denounce Side Agreements to NAFTA, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Aug. 17,
1993) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. See infra notes 149-57 and accompanying
text for brief discussion of side agreements.
82 ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 21.
83 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 302, annex 302.2, app. 2.1, annex 300-B, §§ 2, 3. See also
Summary of North American Free Trade Agreement, LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL REP.: MEXICO &
CENTRAL AMERICA (Latin American Newsletters, Ltd.), Sept. 24, 1992, at 8. See also Cynthia
Mitchell, Pact's Textile & Apparel Provisions Block Most Duty-Free Importing, ATLANTAJ. & CONST.,
Oct. 1, 1992, at D2.
84 NAFrA, supra note 4, arts. 401, 402, annex 300-B, § 7, annex 401, § XI.
85 See NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 801, 802, annex 300-B, §§ 4, 5.
86 See NAFTA, supra note 4, annex 300-B, § 2; see also DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED
NoRTm AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, Aug. 12, 1992, (prepared by the governments of
Canada, Mexico and the United States), available in WESTLAW, NAFTA Library [hereinafter
DESCIPTION].
87 NAFrA, supra note 4, annex 300-B, § 3; DESCRIPTION, supra note 86.
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treatment, and thus are a vital part of NAIFTA.88 For most textiles and
apparel the "yarn-forward" rule of origin applies.89 All products
wholly-made from yarn and fabric produced in North America and as-
sembled in North America will receive duty-free treatment as soon as
NAIFTA is implemented. 90 Goods produced from some fabrics not nor-
mally produced in the United States, such as silks and tweeds, can re-
ceive duty-free treatment up to fixed levels.91 Additionally, some yarns,
fabrics, and apparel produced in North America out of materials not
manufactured in North America can still receive duty-free treatment
up to certain import levels, called tariff rate quotas.92 No NAIFTA
country may institute new quotas except as provided. by the safeguard
provisions of NAFrA.93
If increased imports from one NAFTA country cause substantial
damage to the textile or apparel industries of another, the importing
country may invoke temporary safeguard provisions until such time as
the industry has stabilized.94 Safeguard provisions include increased
tariffs or the imposition of quotas on the damaging products.95 How-
ever, damage resulting from products that meet the rules of origin can
only be combatted by increases in tariffs and not by the imposition of
quotas.9 6
IV. NAFTA's Effects: Differing Views
Opinions differ as to the possible effects of NAFTA on the U.S.
economy. In general, industry leaders promote the agreement as an
opportunity for their companies to become more efficient, to reduce
costs by taking advantage of cheap labor, and to sell to an expanded
8 See NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 401, 402, annex 300-B, § 7, annex 401, § XI.
89 Mitchell, supra note 83. There is also a fiber-forward provision for synthetic materi-
als. NAFTA, supra note 4, annex 401, § XI; see also DESCRIMON, supra note 86.
90 NAFTA, supra note 4, annex 401, § XI. See Mitchell, supra note 83;Jim Ostroff, Indus-
ry Panel Gives Qualified Nod to NAFTA, WWD, Sept. 21, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Industry Panel
Gives Nod to NAFTA]. Additionally, some products that are not comprised of North American
materials can still receive the preferential treatment of NAFTA if they have undergone sub-
stantial transformation in North America or if a certain percentage of the materials of which
the products are constituted are from North America. NAFTA, supra note 4, annex 401,
§ XI; DEscRIMoN, supra note 86.
91 NAFTA, supra note 4, annex 401, § XI; Mitchell, supra note 83; Ostroff, Industry Panel
Gives Nod to NAFIA, supra note 90.
92 NAFTA, supra note 4, annex 401, § XI; DESCRIPTION, supra note 86.
93 NAFrA, supra note 4, annex 300-B, § 5; DEsciurnoN, supra note 86.
94 NAFrA, supra note 4, annex 300-B, §§ 4, 5; DESCRIPTON, supra note 86. NAFTA lists
factors relevant to the determination of whether increased imports actually caused sufficient
damage to an industry to warrant the implementation of the safeguard provisions. Factors
include "such relevant economic variables as output, productivity, utilization of capacity, in-
ventories, market share, exports, wages, employment, domestic prices, profits and invest-
ment." NAFrA, supra note 4, annex 300-B, § 4. NAFTA expressly states that "changes in
technology or consumer preferences" shall not support a determination of substantial harm
to an industry. NAFrA, supra note 4, annex 300-B, § 4.
95 NAFTA, supra note 4, annex 300-B, §§ 4, 5; DascRIpriON, supra note 86.
96 NAFTA, supra note 4, annex 300-B, §§ 4, 5; DESCRIPTION, supra note 86.
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market.97 Union leaders and workers oppose NAFTA because they
fear that corporations will move production to Mexico 98 to take advan-
tage of its lower wages.9 9 Finally, most studies of the potential effects
of NAFTA conclude that it will have little or no effect on the U.S. econ-
omy or U.S. employment over the long or short term. 100 Most of the
studies indicate that the apparel industry will be among the losers and
the textile industry will be among the gainers. 10 1 These studies predict
that the effects on the textile and apparel industry will be much the
same as suggested by the proponents of NAFTA. However, the overall
effects on the economy will be small and positive. 10 2
A. Proponents
Industry leaders judge the benefits of NAFTA by its effects on effi-
ciency and not upon the likelihood that the agreement will create
jobs.'0 3 They believe the agreement will benefit the United States by
97 Zelenko, supra note 38.
98 U.S., Canada, Mexico Reach Agreement, supra note 2.
99 Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Is NAFTA Good for the U.S. ?/No: It'll Exploit Workers and the
Environmen USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 1993, at 13A.
100 See, e.g., LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 2-2; POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 2, at 2-2.
There have been several studies done on the potential effects of NAFTA. See UNITED STATES
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2516, ECONOMY-WIDE MODELING OF THE ECONOMIC IMPLICA-
TIONS OF A FTA wrrH MExIcO AND A NAFTA wITH CANADA (May 1992) [hereinafter ECONOMY-
WIDE 1]; UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2508, ECONOMY-WIDE MODELING OF
THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF A FTA WITH MEXICO AND A NAFTA WITH CANADA (May 1992)
(addendum to Pub. No. 2516) [hereinafter ECONOMY-WIDE 2]; ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra
note 7; LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2; MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2; POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note
2. See also Carlos Bachrach & Lorris Mizrahi, The Economic Impact of a Free Trade Agreement
Between the United States and Mexico: A CGE Analysis, in ECONOMY-WIDE 1, at 16 & ECONOMY-
WIDE 2, at 37 [hereinafter Peat Marwick Study]; Clinton R. Sheills & Robert C. Shelburne, A
Summay of "Industrial Effects of a Free Trade Agreement Between Mexico and the U.S.A.," by the
Interindustry Economic Research Fund, Inc., in ECONOMY-WIDE 1, at 15 & ECONOMY-WIDE 2, at 5
[hereinafter Almon Study].
101 See, e.g., LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 4-38 to 4-41; MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 6-7;
POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 2, at 8-1 to 8-6.
102 See studies listed in supra note 100. The studies vary in their methods. The ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, and MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, studies are more general and do
not involve much technical economic theory. The International Trade Commission studies,
ECONOMY-WIDE 1 & 2, supra note 100, LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, and POTENTIAL IMPACT,
supra note 2, involve complex economic theory, an explanation of which is beyond the scope
of this Comment. The International Trade Commission's ECONOMY-WIDE studies are a collec-
tion of twelve technical papers, and economists' discussions of each, which were presented at
a symposium in February of 1992.
103 No one, however, expects the benefits of NAFTA to be particularly large. The studies
conducted on the potential effects of NAFTA on the U.S. economy conclude that the agree-
ment's effects, if any, will be small, but positive. See studies listed in supra note 100. Even
though Mexico is the United States's third largest trading partner, Mexico's share of U.S.
trade is very small. ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 7, at 13; LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at
1-3. Mexico's output is one-twenty-fifth of that of the United States, and the entire Mexican
market is only 4% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Likely Impact, supra note 2, at 2-2;
MacNeil/Lehrer, supra note 30; MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, summary. U.S. Gross National
Product (GNP) in 1990 was approximately $5,500 billion while Mexico's GNP was about $200
billion. MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 4. Because the Mexican economy is so small in com-
parison to the U.S. economy, trade with Mexico is unlikely to have much effect on the U.S.
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increasing demand for U.S. products, such as textiles, while enabling
each of the member countries to become more efficient and more
competitive with the rest of the world.10 4
Although the Mexican economy is small relative to the U.S. econ-
omy, and the Mexican people are relatively poor,105 the agreement will
help the Mexican economy expand by further reducing barriers to
trade with the United States.' 0 6 As the Mexican economy expands, so
will the market for U.S. goods. Mexican imports will increase and the
Mexican people will benefit by obtaining more buying power.10 7 As a
result, the Mexican people will demand and purchase more U.S.-made
products, increasing U.S. exports to Mexico.' 08
The Congressional Research Service study predicts that U.S. ex-
ports to Mexico will grow faster than. imports from Mexico because of
the dynamics in the rate of exchange of dollars for pesos. 109 United
States investment in Mexico would be in pesos and therefore, United
States firms or individuals wishing to invest in Mexico would have to
exchange dollars for pesos. The demand for pesos would exert an up-
ward pressure on the currency's value. As the peso increased in value,
U.S. goods would become cheaper in Mexico, and Mexican goods
would become more expensive in the United States. Therefore, de-
mand for U.S. goods will increase faster than demand for Mexican
goods.10 Jeffrey J: Schott, Senior Fellow of the Institute for Interna-
tional Economics, stated before the U.S. House of Representatives that
he expected the United States to run a $7 billion trade surplus with
Mexico throughout the mid-1990s. 1 1
All three NAFTA countries are expected to experience increases
in their Gross Domestic Products (GDP). Mexico will gain the most
with an estimated increase in GDP of between 0.01% and 11.39%."2
economy. LIKELY IMPACr, supra note 2, at 2-2. Additionally, barriers to trade between Mexico
and the United States are already fairly low. MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 4. Fifty percent of
Mexican goods already enter the United States duty-free. MacNeil/Lehrer, supra note 30.
Therefore, the two countries already receive most of the benefits from trade with one an-
other and the continued reduction of these barriers will have little effect. LIKELY IMPACr,
supra note 2, at 2-2.
104 Katherine Snow, New Buyer Confidence to Buoy Textilers, Bus. J.-CHARLOTrE, Dec. 28,
1992, at 12.
105 Polity Briefing No. 46-Special Section, ROLL CALL (Levitt Communications, Inc.) Oct. 5,
1992, at 28. Senator Howard Metzenbaum, who opposes NAFTA, said that Mexico has a 20%
unemployment rate, a 40% poverty rate, and an average per capita annual income of $2,490.
Id.
106 LIKELY IMPACr, supra note 2, at vii-viii.
107 Susan Dentzer, The Pain and Gain of Trade, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 28, 1992,
at 62, 68; MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 4.
108 MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 4.
109 Id.
110 Id.
Ill An Assessment, supra note 34. Mr. Schott spoke before the Committee on Small Busi-
ness of the House of Representatives. Id.
112 ECONOMY-WIDE 1, supra note 100, at 6, 15.
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Canada will gain between 0.12% and 10.57% of real GDP. 113 Finally,
the United States is likely to gain the least with an estimated GDP in-
crease of 0.02% to 2.07%.114
Industry leaders also believe that NAFTA will "impel industrial re-
organization along regional lines, with firms taking best advantage of
each country's ability to produce components and assembled products,
thus enhancing competitiveness in the global marketplace."' 15 Be-
cause of Mexico's lower wages, some labor intensive industries may
move to Mexico. 116 However, such job loss should be offset by an in-
crease in the number of higher paying jobs in the United States.11 7
To help relocate U.S. workers from these lower paying, lower-
skilled jobs to the higher paying, high-skilled jobs, the Clinton adminis-
tration has just added ajob training plan to the NAFTA implementing
legislation.118 The $90 million Clinton plan will aid workers who lose
their jobs between January 1, 1994, and June 30, 1995, because of
NAFTA. 119 The plan allows financial assistance to displaced workers as
well as "career counseling, testing, job-placement assistance, training,
income support and child and transportation allowances." 120
Mexico's push to modernize will enlarge demand for U.S. high-
tech equipment and machinery as well as other high-tech U.S. prod-
ucts. 12 1 To keep output in line with demand, U.S. firms will hire more
workers for the higher paying, high-tech jobs.122 Studies in this area
seem to agree that there will be more jobs created than lost, and those
jobs that are created will be higher paying than those that are lost.123
Textile and apparel industry executives base their support of
NAFTA on these comparative advantage theories. 124 Comparative ad-
vantage theories predict that industries in which a country is not com-
petitive should move to a country in which that industry can better
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 An Assessment, supra note 34.
116 Low-Wage Strategy Will Hurt Country, PR Newswire, Aug. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Currnt File.
117 MacNeil/Lehrer, supra note 30. However, one study predicts that the loss of apparel
jobs will more than offset the job gains in the textile industry. POTENTIAL ImpAcr, supra note
2, at 8-2.
118 Keith Bradsher, Clinton Offers Job Training for Trade Pact Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1993, at B8 [hereinafter Clinton Offers Job Training].
119 Norm Brewer, Retraining Program Needs to Be Retooled, Administration Says, Gannet News
Service, Oct. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
120 David Lightman, Clinton UnveilsJob-Training Plan, HARTaoRD CourAwr, Oct. 21, 1993,
at Al.
121 Dentzer, supra note 107.
122 Zelenko, supra note 38.
123 POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 2, at 2-3. The Institute for International Economics
predicts that although there will be as many as 150,000 unskilled factory jobs lost in indus-
tries such as apparel, as many as 325,000 new jobs would be created by 1995. Zelenko, supra
note 38.
124 See Textile Industry Leader Advocates NAFTA Approach over Uruguay Round Trade Proposal,
PR Newswire, Oct. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
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compete. The theory predicts that certain products should not be pro-
duced in the United States but instead should be produced in Mexico.
Many companies in the labor intensive apparel industry are expected
to move to Mexico. 1 25 Thus, the lower costs of unskilled labor in Mex-
ico will allow the apparel companies to become more profitable and
more competitive with the rest of the world, especially with Far East
companies. 126 Therefore, companies that are able to move their pro-
duction plants to Mexico should profit from NAFTA.
NAFTA should increase demand for apparel products, thus in-
creasing demand for textiles, an industry that is expected to gain from
NAFTA. 127 The President of AMTI, M.L. Cates, Jr., sees the treaty as a
"much-needed shot in the arm, enabling [the textile industry] to work
with Mexico and Canada for mutual new growth opportunities ....
NAFTA can curb the steady increases in imports from the Far East and
the job losses they have caused in the United States during the last
decade."1 28  Because the United States has a comparative advantage
over Mexico in the textile industry, textile companies in the United
States will benefit from NAFTA. 12 9 The textile industry is a relatively
high-tech industry. It is highly automated and requires highly-skilled
workers. The Mexican textile industry has not been modernized and
does not produce as high quality fabrics as its U.S. counterpart.13 0
Therefore, NAFTA will create a higher demand for the better quality
U.S. textile products, 131 and firms will hire more high-skilled labor to
125 MAJOR IssuEs, supra note 2, at 6-7; Almon Study, supra note 100; Peat Marwick Study,
supra note 100; POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 2, at 8-5 to 8-6. But most studies do not suggest
that any industry will lose too many jobs. The Peat Marwick Study suggests that as a result of
NAFTA, employment will fall by less that one half of one percent in the apparel industry and
one tenth of one percent in the textile industry. The studies show that apparel will lose only
between 500 and 720jobs per year for ten years. MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 7 n.1 1 (citing
Peat Marwick Study, see supra note 100 for full citation). See also Zelenko, supra note 38; see
generally, Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100.
126 Zelenko, supra note 38.
127 See, e.g., LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 4-38 to 441; MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 6-7;
POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 2, at 8-1 to 8-6. Increased demand for textiles also will come
from the rules of origin, some of which require North American content to be almost 100%
of a product in order for that product to qualify for NAFTA's preferential treatment.
Zelenko, supra note 38. Additionally, Mexico has high production costs and poor quality
textiles. LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 4-39.
128 U.S. Textile Industry Improved in 1992, supra note 68.
129 POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 2, at 8-4.
130 LIKELY IMPACT, supra note 2, at 4-39.
131 Yet, most textile and apparel executives believe that the recent approval of the Uru-
guay Round of GATT could eliminate many of the benefits of NAFTA. See General Develop-
ments: Legislative Calendar, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 143 (Jan. 27, 1993); see also
supra note 20 for discussion of GATT. The Uruguay Round proposal provides for a phase-out
of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). Randall Palmer, Proposed GAT Accord at a Glance,
Reuters (BC Cycle) Dec. 22, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. See Draft
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT
Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991); Miguel Montaiii-Moa, International Law and Interna-
tional Relations Cheek to Cheek: An International Law/International Relations Perspective on the U.S./
EC Agricultural Export Subsidies Dispute, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REc. 1 (1993). The MFA
was first developed during the Nixon years, Joyce Barrett, Execs, Workers Recall Bush's Backing
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expand output.
For example, Guilford Mills' CEO, Chuck Hayes, stated that under
NAFTA the U.S. textile and apparel industries will be able to compete
with Far East imports by taking advantage of cheap production costs in
Mexico.132 By making less expensive goods, U.S. industries can sell
more.13 3 Demand will increase and production expand to meet de-
mand, creating more jobs.
B. Opponents
Union officials, and many workers, measure the desirability of a
free trade agreement by the number of jobs lost or created. The un-
ions oppose NAFTA because they believe that the agreement will en-
courage corporations to move to Mexico to take advantage of cheap
unskilled Mexican labor, 134 thus decreasing employment in the United
States.1 35 They believe that Mexico's low wages, lower labor and envi-
ronmental standards, and proximity to the United States, as well as the
reduction of trade barriers, will make Mexico a less expensive and,
therefore, a more desirable location for production. 136 Labor inten-
sive industries in particular will be forced to move to Mexico.1 37 As a
result of the move, many low-skilled jobs will be lost in the United
States. Many of these jobs are union jobs and will likely be replaced by
higher-skilled nonunion jobs. It is for this reason in part that the un-
ions object to NAFTA.
Bruce Raynor, International Vice President of Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union, predicts that as many as 250,000
jobs will be lost nationwide in the first twelve to eighteen months after
NAFTA goes into effect.138 Even the Bush Administration's Secretary
of Labor, Lynn Martin, said that as many as 150,000 jobs could be lost
over ten years. 139 Thomas Donahue of the AFL-CIO stated that as pro-
duction moves from the United States to Mexico, between 500,000 and
for NAFTA, China MFN, WWD, Oct. 27, 1992, at 16, and permits countries to restrict textile
and apparel imports from Third World nations through the use of quotas. Palmer, supra.
The GATT proposal would phase out all quotas on textiles and apparel while allowing tariffs
to remain. Id.
132 Zelenko, supra note 38.
133 Id.
134 Mike Magner, Shaky Union Force Tries to Fight NAFTA, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 5,
1993, at Al.
135 Economists Say Uruguay Round Necessary as "Umbrella"for Trade Blocs, Daily Report for
Executives (BNA) 207 (Oct. 26, 1992). It is not just unions that feel this way. In his new
book, Ross Perot outlines his views on the detrimental effects of NAFTA. Ross PEROT & PAT
CHOATE, SAVE YOURJOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY* WHY NAFTA MUST BE STOPPED-Nowl (1993).
But see, Michael G. Wilson, Setting the Record Straight: Evaluating Ross Perot's Allegations Against
NAFTA, HEPITAGE FOUNDATION REP. No. 959 (Sept. 30, 1993).
136 MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 7.





600,000jobs would be lost during the rest of the 1990S,140 and Senator
Metzenbaum predicted that the number would be closer to 900,000.141
Senator Metzenbaum pointed out that Canada has had higher av-
erage wages than those in the United States, and when Canada signed
the free trade agreement with the United States, it suffered substantial
trade losses. 14 2 Thus, he argued that because the U.S. wage differen-
tial with Mexico is much greater than with Canada, the United States
should suffer greater job loss than Canada did.143 Additionally, the
Senator argued that the loss ofjobs caused by NAFTA will not be offset
by an increase in U.S. jobs resulting from an increase in Mexican con-
sumers' buying power and demand for U.S. goods. 144 He said,
"[c] urrently, Mexico has a 20 percent unemployment rate, a 40 percent
poverty rate, and a gross domestic product one-twentieth of [that of the
United States]. Mexican workers, with an average annual income of
$2,490, can barely afford food and shelter and are in no position to
buy our products."1 45
Many workers also oppose NAFTA because they fear that the cor-
porate flight will take theirjobs away. The fact that a better job may be
created does not mean much to a person who loses his or her job.
That theoretical newly created job may not be in the same town or
state as the displaced worker, and even if it is, the worker may not have
the skills necessary to perform the job.
In response to this argument, Clinton has proposed a new job
training plan.' 46 The opponents of NAFTA are not impressed with
Clinton's assurances that this plan will help place people in new jobs.
According to Mark A. Anderson, Director of the AFL-CIO Task Force
on Trade, "[i]t strikes me as a NAFTA Band-Aid." 14 7 Many opponents
believe that the job training program is just too small. 148
Unions and workers also oppose NAFTA because they believe that
large U.S. companies are exploiting workers in Mexico as well as taking
advantage of the "lax enforcement of Mexican environmental and
safety laws." 149 These groups argue that the side agreements signed by
Clinton in August of 1993 are insufficient to protect workers' rights
140 MacNeil/Lehrer, supra note 30.
141 Policy Briefing No. 46-Special Section, supra note 105, at 28. Senator Metzenbaum based
his estimate on the number of Canadian jobs relocated to the United States after the U.S.-
Canada free trade agreement was signed in 1989 and believes as many as 40% of U.S. workers





146 See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text for a brief outline of Clinton's job
training program.
147 Bradsher, Clinton Offers Job Training, supra note 118, at B8.
148 Id.
149 Joe Ward, The Continental Divide: Jobs Lost or Created? Environmental Disaster? What
NAFTA Will Mean Depends on Who's Talking, COURIER-J., Sept. 26, 1993, at El.
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and the environment in Mexico.' 5 0 The labor side agreement sets up
commissions to report on each country's labor laws and the enforce-
ment of such laws.' 5 1 Additionally, the agreement sets up dispute set-
tlement panels that can impose fines or trade sanctions on any party
that fails to enforce properly its labor laws. 152 The environmental
agreement also sets up commissions which report on each country's
enforcement of environmental laws. 153 This agreement also provides
for sanctions if a country fails to enforce its laws.' 54
Union leaders believe that these agreements are insufficient to
protect workers' rights and the environment. The side agreements
"have no teeth" and have "no real enforcement mechanisms." 155 Addi-
tionally, the dispute settlement process is "cumbersome to the point of
being unworkable."' 5 6 Therefore, the agreements offer no disincen-
tive for large companies who will move their production plants to Mex-
ico to exploit the low-paid Mexican workers and the low level of
enforcement of Mexican environmental laws. 15 7
Finally, some businesses oppose NAFTA because they think that
small companies will be hurt by competition with companies that can
take advantage of cheap Mexican labor.'58 These small companies
may not be able to move to Mexico. Thus, they will be competing with
larger companies that can charge less for their products because they
paid less for the labor.
C. Counter-Arguments to Opponents' Views
Proponents of NAFrA argue that U.S. companies will not flock to
Mexico. They argue that U.S. employment and wages will not decline
because the barriers to trade with Mexico are so low now that any large
150 See, e.g., Jim Ostroff, Unions: NAFIA Side Deal on Labor Too Lax, WWD, Sept. 21, 1993,
at 11; Labor Leaders Denounce Side Agreements to NAFTA, supra note 81. The labor agreement
states as its objectives the promotion of:
the freedom of association, the right to bargain collectively, the right to strike,
prohibition of forced labor, restrictions on labor by children and young peo-
ple, minimum employment standards, elimination of employment discrimina-
tion, equal pay for men and women, prevention of occupational accidents and
diseases, compensation in cases of work accidents or occupational diseases, and
protection of migrant workers.
Labor and Environmental Accords, supra note 78. The environmental agreement sets out as its
objectives "the promotion of sustainable development, cooperation on the conservation, pro-
tection and enhancement of the environment and the effective enforcement of and compli-
ance with domestic environmental laws." Id.




155 Labor Leaders Denounce Side Agreements to NAFTA, supra note 81; see also supra note 99.
156 Labor Leaders Denounce Side Agreements to NAFTA, supra note 81.
157 Id.




dislocations and wage adjustments have already been made. 159 Other
proponents argue that although the base wage in Mexico is signifi-
cantly lower than that in the United States, employers in Mexico are
required to pay social security, health and unemployment benefits,
and a required bonus of one month's pay per year.160 Although many
of these expenses exist in the United States, these payments equal only
twenty-five percent to thirty percent of employees' pay in the United
States and fifty percent of pay in Mexico.'61 Additionally, according to
Eric Hoyle, CEO of Bali, "[ i] n many cases you have to subsidize a plant
cafeteria and subsidize public transportation-you basically have to
pay the local bus company to do special routes where your workers
live.... In most locations [Bali] has a relationship with a local physi-
cian.' 62 These added expenses for Mexican labor reduce the wage
differentials somewhat between the United States and Mexico.' 63
Industry leaders argue that the better paying, high-skilled jobs will
not go to Mexico. The lack of high-skilled workers and the lack of a
reliable infrastructure will keep most of the better paying jobs in the
United States.164 Eric Hoyle argued that the textile industry requires a
reliable infrastructure such as water and electricity for manufacturing,
finishing, and dyeing.' 65 Because Mexico's infrastructure is unreliable,
he believes that most textile plants will remain in the United States.1 66
Additionally, highly automated industries such as cutting operations
will also remain in the United States because they require high tech-
nology and high-skilled workers that are unavailable in Mexico.167
Even many of those who agree that NAFTA will cause the loss ofjobs to
Mexico believe that NAFTA will only accelerate the job migration that
is inevitable. 68
V. Conclusion
The proponents of NAFTA believe that the Agreement will help
make the United States more competitive in the world market. It will
increase demand for U.S. products in Mexico and create more jobs in
the United States. On the other hand, the opponents feel that NAFTA
will lead to a loss of American jobs as U.S. companies move to Mexico
159 MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 7. See also Zelenko, supra note 38. Bali Co. and Bur-
lington Industries are just two of the many U.S. textile and apparel companies that have
already opened plants in Mexico. Id. See also Kelly Greene, NAFTA or Not, N.C. Textiles Head
South, Bus. J.-CHARLoTT-, Sept. 13, 1993, § 1, at 1.
160 Zelenko, supra note 38.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See generally Louis S. Richman, How NAFTA Will Help America, FORT., Apr. 19. 1993, at
95.
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to take advantage of the lower costs of production. The proponents
point out, however, that although some existing jobs may be lost, such
loss will be outweighed by the number of new jobs that are created.
The studies seem to support the proponents' views that NAFTA
will be beneficial to the United States, although the benefit may be
small. NAFTA will open up the U.S. economy to Mexican imports as
well as opening the Mexican economy to U.S. products. As Mexico
increases its exports to the United States, its economy will expand and
its people will gain buying power, increasing the market for U.S.
goods.
Although it is inevitable that some U.S. jobs will go to Mexico,
union officials opposing NAFTA have not taken into account the crea-
tion of jobs that the Agreement will promote. Some jobs in industries
such as apparel will be lost, but more will be created in other indus-
tries. Through the use of job retraining programs already in place in
the United States and President Clinton's proposed new job training
programs, the low-skilled workers who lose theirjobs to Mexico can be
retrained to work in other higher-skilled, higher paying positions cre-
ated by the increased trade under NAFTA.
Finally by transferring U.S. resources, such as labor, to the indus-
tries and sectors in which they are most competitive, the United States
can better compete in the international market. The United States
does not enjoy a competitive, advantage in the apparel industry (with
the exception of cutting operations) and, thus, would profit from
abandoning that industry, and transferring its resources to an industry
such as textiles in which it does have a comparative advantage. NAFTA
will result in this relocation of resources and thus will benefit the
United States.
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